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Tort Responsibility of
Mentally Disabled Persons
James W. Ellis
The standard of care to be applied in tort cases involving mentally disabled
people has not been reconsideredin recent years. Traditional rationalesfor
the "objective" standardareless persuasive in the context of currentlegal approaches to the rights of mentally ill and retardedpersons. Analogies to
children (especially the concept of "mental age") and to physically handicapped adults merit reexamination.
I. INTRODUCTION

The past decade has witnessed a quantum leap in legal interest in the
status of mentally ill and mentally retarded people, accompanied by
dramatic changes in the substantive law regarding such persons. New
statutes and case law have transformed the areas of commitment, 1 guardianship, confidentiality, consent to treatment, and institutional condiJames W. Ellis is Visiting Scholar, American Bar Foundation, and Associate Professor, University
of New Mexico School of Law. A.B., 1968, Occidental College; J.D., 1974, University of California, Berkeley. The author is grateful for the research assistance of Paula Hanson and for the careful
reading and criticism of the manuscript by Spencer Kimball and by Ted Occhialino, Professor of
Law, University of New Mexico School of Law.
1. E.g., Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979); Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378 (M.D. Ala.
1974); Developments in the Law-Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 1190
(1974); Mental Health Law Project, Legal Issues in State Mental Health Care: Proposals for
Change: Civil Commitment, 2 Mental Disability L. Rep. 73 (1977).
2. E.g., Mental Health Law Project, Legal Issues in State Mental Health Care: Proposals for
Change: Guardianship, 2 Mental Disability L. Rep. 443 (1978); ABA Special Commission on the
Mentally Disabled, Developmental Disabilities State Legislative Project, Guardianship & Conservatorship: Statutory Survey; Model Statute (Discussion ed., Washington, D.C.: American Bar Association, June 1979).
3. E.g., Caesar v. Mountanos, 542 F.2d 1064 (9th Cir. 1976); Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of
Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976); American Psychiatric Association,
Confidentiality and Third Parties, Task Force Report No. 9 (Washington, D.C.: American
Psychiatric Association, 1975); Mental Health Law Project, Legal Issues in State Mental Health
Care: Proposals for Change: Therapeutic Confidentiality, 2 Mental Disability L. Rep. 337 (1977).
4. E.g., Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Mass. 1979) 634 F.2d 650 (1st Cir. 1980), cert.
granted, 101 Ct. 1972 (1981); Aden v. Younger, 57 Cal. App. 3d 662, 129 Cal. Rptr. 535 (1976);
Superintendent of Belchertown v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977); Alan A. Stone,
Mental Health and Law: A System in Transition 97-108 (New York: Jason Aronson, Inc., 1976);
Robert Plotkin, Limiting the Therapeutic Orgy: Mental Patients' Right to Refuse Treatment, 72 Nw.
U.L. Rev. 461 (1977).
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tions,5 to name just a few. Even the criminal responsibility of mentally
disabled people, an area that cannot be said to have been neglected in
previous decades, has undergone substantial change in recent years.'
Despite all this activity, questions involving the tort liability of the mentally disabled have received almost no attention.
Perhaps it should not be surprising that the issue of tort responsibility
has not been reconsidered. There was certainly plenty of competition for
a place on the agenda of the 1970s and for the attention of courts, legislators, scholars, and advocates. The flood of activity in mental disability
law was generated in large part by a new specialty within the bar which
addressed the problems of the mentally ill and mentally retarded. Tort issues could have been thought lacking in sex appeal, in comparison with
some others.7 And the cases to raise those issues were not likely to be numerous. Mentally disabled persons as a class tend to be judgment proof;
as plaintiffs, they seldom raise problems unique to their class. So perhaps
it is to be expected that tort responsibility and its neglected siblings in the
family of mental disability law (contractual rights and obligations,
testamentary capacity, etc.) should have been left for reconsideration in
the postdiluvian era.
Reconsideration is warranted, however. The mental disability cases of
the 1970s have radically changed our view of the legal status of mentally
disabled people, and those views now bear little resemblance to the historical attitudes that shaped the policies of the current tort law. An affirmation of the full citizenship status of mentally disabled people' has accompanied a heightened solicitude for their welfare. 9 A reconsideration
of the rules of tort responsibility will suggest that these two praiseworthy
attitudes may not be easy to translate into legal rules. If this rather unhappy hypothesis should be confirmed, it may give cause to reconsider
the status of the mentally disabled under the law as a whole, and it may
5. E.g., Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974); Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v.
Halderman, 101 Ct. 1531, 49 U.S.L.W. 4363 (1981); Jay Katz, The Right to Treatment-an Enchanting Legal Fiction? 36 U. Chi. L. Rev. 755 (1969); Charles R. Halpern, The Right to Rehabilitation in President's Committee on Mental Retardation, The Mentally Retarded Citizen and the Law
384 (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Free Press, 1976); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 43-1-7 (1979).
6. E.g., United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Herbert Fingarette & Ann
Fingarette Hasse, Mental Disabilities and Criminal Responsibility (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979).
7. Exhuming the reasonable man might seem less attractive than righting outrageous injustice or
establishing constitutional landmarks. E.g., O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975) (successful attempt to right an outrageous injustice); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979) (failed attempt to
right an outrageous wrong); Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972) (establishing constitutional

landmark).
8. See generally President's Committee on Mental Retardation, The Mentally Retarded Citizen
and the Law (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Free Press, 1976).
9. E.g., Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971), aff'd in relevant part sub. nom.
Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
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require of the courts and legislatures a greater sophistication of analysis
in matters involving this group. A further reason for reconsideration may
be found in the changing tort law itself. Rules governing the tort responsibility of the mentally disabled were developed, in large part, at a time
when strict liability was widely accepted, and they were criticized (with remarkably little effect on the courts) when fault became the governing
principle in negligence law. With the entrenchment of the fault principle
and the advent of comparative negligence in many jurisdictions, the
policy underpinnings of the current rules have weakened, if not collapsed. If the current rules are to be retained, new rationales must be developed or the old ones must be refurbished.
This article will examine the policy rationales for the traditional standard in the area of negligence. It will then consider the changes that have
occurred in recent years and will evaluate possible analogies to the standard of care for children and for the physically handicapped.

II. THE OBJECTIVE STANDARD FOR
MENTALLY DISABLED DEFENDANTS

A. The Rule and Its Origin
While under some circumstances mentally disabled 0 people may be exonerated from responsibility and punishment for criminal acts they have
committed, the common law has not extended the same dispensation for
tortious acts. The general rule is that mentally disabled adults are to be
held responsible for the torts they commit."I The rule is almost invariably
applied to both "intentional torts"' 2 and acts of negligence.
This rule is remarkably well settled in this country. In some states the
10. This article will use the term "mentally disabled" to refer both to mentally ill and to mentally
retarded people. See note 16 infra. The courts appear not to have drawn a distinction between these
two groups.
11. McGuire v. Almy, 297 Mass. 323, 8 N.E.2d 760 (1937); Johnson v. Lambotte, 147 Colo. 203,
363 P.2d 165 (1961); William J. Curran, Tort Liability of the Mentally Ill and Mentally Deficient, 21
Ohio St. L.J. 52 (1960); American Law Institute, Restatement (Second) of Torts § 283B (1965).
12. See, e.g., In re Meyer's Guardianship, 218 Wis. 381, 261 N.W. 211 (1935) (arson); Morse v.
Crawford, 17 Vt. 499, 44 Am. Dec. 349 (1845) (conversion); Krom v. Schoonmaker, 3 Barb. 647
(N.Y. 1848) (false imprisonment); Kaczer v. Marrero, 324 So. 2d 717 (Fla. App. 1976) (assault and
battery).
Courts have had somewhat greater difficulty with cases of torts that require intent as a necessary
element, such as malicious prosecution, alienation of affection, misrepresentation, and defamation.
In the last category, compare Irvine v. Gibson, 117 Ky. 306, 77 S.W. 1106 (1904) (malice required),
with Ullrich v. New York Press Co., 23 Misc. 168, 50 N.Y.S. 788 (1898) (no malice required). No
cases have been found that consider the intent of mentally disabled defendants since the defamation
area was constitutionalized in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), and Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). The impact of Gertz on mentally disabled defendants is not
yet clear, but it could be argued that its prohibition on defamation judgments in the absence of fault
prohibits a court from finding liability where the defendant's mental disability negates the element
of fault.
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principle is codified in statute, 3 but more frequently it has been adopted
by the courts. Its origin can be (and often has been) traced back to
Weaver v. Ward, 4 a seventeenth-century English case in which the statement of the rule is clearly dictum.'" It is not difficult to understand, in an
environment of strict liability for torts, why the early courts found it unnecessary to excuse the tortious acts of "lunatics" or "idiots and imbeciles.' '1 6 Since lack of moral blame was not sufficient to bar recovery
from a mentally typical defendant (as in the case of an "unavoidable"
accident), it would have made no sense to immunize the mentally disabled defendant because his actions were the product of his mental condition. Within the context of strict liability, the rule made sense irrespective
of the law's (and society's) general view of the status and actions of mentally disabled people.
The issue became more difficult with the introduction of the fault principle of tort liability. 7 With this development, the courts undertook the
quasi-metaphysical task of assigning blame for individual actions, although the blame and its consequences differed from a finding of crimi-

13. E.g., Cal. Civ. Code § 41 (West 1954); Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 27-1-711 (1979); N.D. Cent.
Code § 14-10-03 (1971); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 15 §§ 25, 26 (West 1972); S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. §
27A-2-4 (1976).
14. Weaver v. Ward, 80 Eng. Rep. 284, Hob. 134 (1616).
15. The case did not involve any allegation of mental disability.
16. The terminology changes with remarkable frequency in this area. Early courts most frequently
used the terms "idiot" and "imbecile" to describe persons who were mentally retarded. Sometimes
the two were used interchangeably, and at other times they connoted a differentation of ability
(higher functioning retarded people were classed as imbeciles). In the early years of this decade, professionals (mostly physicians) began using an additional term, "feeble-minded," to describe those
with greater ability than imbeciles. All of these terms are now archaic, and their continued use by
some courts is demeaning. Current usage categorizes the ability of retarded persons on a scale of
profound, severe, moderate, and mild retardation. Until 1973, an additional category of
"borderline" retardation was used to describe those with the smallest degree of disability. But the
American Association on Mental Deficiency, the dominant professional organization in this field,
voted to abolish that category, and persons previously labelled "borderline retarded" are now
generally viewed as falling within the normal range of intelligence, although they may still be called
"slow learners" by the general public. See generally Herbert J. Grossman, ed., Manual on Terminology and Classification in Mental Retardation (Washington, D.C.: American Association on
Mental Deficiency, 1977).
persons over the years. Courts
An even greater variety of labels have been applied to mentally ill
have referred to such persons as "mad," "lunatics," "insane," and "crazy," among numerous
other terms. One difficulty that arises in interpreting early cases is that these terms were sometimes
used to describe only those persons whom we would now consider mentally ill and at other times inand mentally retarded. This is a particular problem in interpreting early
cluded both the mentally ill
statements of tort rules regarding liability of "the insane."
In current usage, the term "mentally disabled" most frequently is an umbrella term that refers to
both the mentally ill and the mentally retarded. Care should be taken not to confuse it with
"developmentally disabled," a term originating in federal statutes and adopted in many states to
describe a variety of disabilities, the most common of which is mental retardation but which does
not include mental illness.
17. See generally G. Edward White, Tort Law in America: An Intellectual History (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1980).
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nal responsibility. The dilemma was thus posed: was it better to retain the
rule of mentally disabled persons' responsibility from the old system of
strict liability, or should something parallel to the criminal law's insanity
defense be adopted for tortious acts? American courts in common law
jurisdictions" identified the matter as a question of public policy and
unanimously chose to retain the old rule. Despite substantial criticism
from legal scholars, 19 courts in intervening decades have not found sufficient reasons to overturn that choice.2 0
B. Policy Rationales for the Rule
Courts and commentators have suggested a number of policy rationales for the objective standard in cases involving mentally disabled
defendants. While the formulations and combinations have differed
somewhat, the most striking fact is that the reasons advanced have been
so consistent over the past century. The rationales most frequently suggested are the following:
1) "[W]here one of two innocent persons must suffer a loss, it should be

'
borne by the one who occasioned it."' 2

2) Liability for negligent acts will encourage those who are responsible for
mentally disabled persons (their families
or guardians) to look after them
22
and prevent them from doing harm.

3) If mentally disabled people are
to live in liberty in society, they should
23
pay for the damage they cause.

18. Louisiana, a civil law jurisdiction, does not follow the common law rule. Yancey v. Maestri,
155 So. 509 (La. Ct. App. 1934). See also La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2319 (West 1979). Yancey contains an extensive discussion of the rule in other countries. For another comparative view, see
Pamela Picher, The Tortious Liability of the Insane in Canada, 13 Osgoode Hall L.J. 193 (1975).
19. See, e.g., Melville Madison Bigelow, The Law of Torts 109 (8th ed. Boston: Little, Brown &
Co., 1907); Frederick Pollock, The Law of Torts: A Treatise on the Principles & Obligations Arising
from Civil Wrongs in the Common Law 35 (Ist
ed. Philadelphia: Blackstone Publishing Co., 1887);
Francis H. Bohlen, Liability in Torts of Infants and Insane Persons, 23 Mich. L. Rev. 9 (1924); W.
G. H. Cook, Mental Deficiency in Relation to Tort, 21 Colum. L. Rev. 333 (1921); Curran, supra
note 11; Robert M. Ague, Jr., The Liability of Insane Persons in Tort Actions, 60 Dick. L. Rev. 211
(1956); Comment, The Tort Liability of Insane Persons for Negligence: A Critique, 39 Tenn. L.
Rev. 705 (1972); Clarence Morris & C. Robert Morris, Jr., Morris on Torts 51 (2d ed. Mineola,
N.Y.: Foundation Press, 1980). For contrary views, see Thomas M. Cooley, A Treatise on the Law
of Torts: Or the Wrongs Which Arise Independent of Contract 115-19 (2d ed. Chicago: Callaghan &
Co., 1888); George J. Alexander & Thomas S. Szasz, Mental illness as an Excuse for Civil Wrongs,
43 Notre Dame Law. 24 (1967).
20. In many jurisdictions, the courts appear not to have been asked. The reason for the small
volume of appellate litigation is not altogether clear. The alternatives that distracted litigators
specializing in mental disability law, as discussed above, would not have applied to personal injury
lawyers.
21. Seals v. Snow, 123 Kan. 88, 90, 254 P. 348, 349 (1927). This reason is frequently cited in both
early and recent cases.
22. McGuire v. Almy, 297 Mass. 323, 8 N.E. 2d 760, 762 (1937); George A. Smoot, The Law of
Insanity 362-63 (Kansas City, Mo.: Vernon Law Books Co., 1929). This rationale is among the most
frequently cited in the early cases.
23. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 283B, Comment b(3) at 17 (1965); Schumann v. Crofoot, 43
Or. App. 53, 602 P.2d 298, 300-301 (1979).
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4) Mental disability is easily feigned,
24 and defendants might choose such an

act of duplicity to avoid liability.
5) It is difficult for courts to distinguish between "true" mental disability
and variations in temperament, intellect, and emotional balance, and to allow all such differences
to serve as excuses would erode the objective stan25
dard in all cases.
6) The insanity defense and the doctrine of diminished capacity have
wreaked havoc in the
26 field of criminal law, and this chaos should not be recreated in tort law.
While the first of these rationales is merely a restatement of the doctrine
of strict liability, the others warrant closer inspection. The second and
third raise important questions about the proper place of mentally disabled people in society; the remaining three speak to the nature of tort
theory and the administration of tort cases.
C. The.Rationales Reconsidered
The contention that mentally disabled defendants should be held liable
because liability will serve as an incentive to greater care on the part of
their custodians is among the most frequently cited rationales. It appeared in the early discussion of the subject and has not been abandoned.
Its sufficiency as a support for the objective standard is limited because it
presupposes a greater control over the acts of mentally disabled people
than is exercised by any but the most draconian of caretakers. Even if relatives and guardians did exercise a sufficient amount of power over the
disabled individual, those employing this rationale must believe the operant motivation to be fear that tort liability will reduce the individual's
estate (and thus, in the case of relatives, their ultimate inheritance from

that estate).2" This belief may be somewhat less than realistic. History

records many strenuous efforts by guardians and relatives to restrain the
24. "So deep is the cunning of the evil doer that it is extremely difficult to detect the ruse, when
he is feigning insanity as a cloak under which he may safely work his nefarious ends. The rule is
therefore necessary, in order that the evil doer may not be led to simulate madness as a means of
escaping the consequence of his tortious acts." Smoot, supra note 22, at 363. "[I]f parties can
escape the consequences of their injurious acts upon the plea of lunacy, there will be a strong temptation to simulate insanity, with a view of masking the malice and revenge of an evil heart." McIntyre v. Sholty, 121 Ill. 660, 13 N.E. 239, 240 (1887).
25. Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 283B, Comment b(1) at 17 (1965). See also O[liver]
W[endeil] Holmes, Jr., The Common Law 108 (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1881).
26. Jolley v. Powell, 299 So. 2d 647, 649 (Fla. App. 1974); William L. Prosser, Handbook of the
Law of Torts 1001 (4th ed. St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co., 1971).
27. If an incentive for caretakers were thought desirable, an action for negligent supervision
would probably be more effective. An interesting, if tangential, modem parallel is the current controversy over the liability of psychiatrists and mental facilities for the tortious acts of their patients.
See Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976). It
has been suggested that creation of this third-party liability will dissuade therapists from treating patients who might prove abnormally prone to commit tortious acts. Alan A. Stone, The Tarasoff
Decisions: Suing Psychotherapists to Safeguard Society, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 358 (1976).
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liberty and actions of mentally ill and retarded persons, but it seems likely that alternative incentives (concern for the disabled individual, embarrassment of the relatives, fear, revulsion, concern for society, etc.) were
probably sufficient to keep most, if not all, from even considering the
possibility of tort liability.
More relevant to the present analysis than the rationale's impracticality
is the underlying attitude it reveals. In 1879 Cooley advanced this argument and supported it by noting that "the State at large is deeply concerned in having all incompetent persons in charge of competent and responsible guardians, whose business it shall be to care for them and to
guard both them and the public against such injuries as would be likely to
result from their condition." 2 By the late nineteenth century it was not a
matter of indifference to society whether the mentally disabled were
under some form of effective control. This was a time in which mentally
disabled people were seen as a threat to society, both through their own
wicked actions and through the likelihood that they would "swamp"
society with their "incompetence" if allowed to reproduce."9 This fear
developed more fully in the early decades of this century into the eugenics
movement, which insisted that such calamities could be averted only if
the mentally disabled were both sterilized and segregated from society.30
In an era when numerous laws were passed to sterilize the mentally defective and to isolate them for life in institutions, it should not be surprising
that courts were comfortable with a rule that was thought to increase the
incentive to remove such troublesome people from active participation in
society. If the fear of tort liability induced relatives or guardians to institutionalize a disabled person (or at least keep him strictly supervised at
home), it was thought that everyone would benefit.
The same attitude can be seen in the statement, found in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, that "[m]ental defectives, if they are to live in
the world, should pay for the damage they do."'" The tone of the Institute's statement betrays, at best, a grudging acceptance of the fact that
mentally disabled people do, in fact, live in the world. This reluctance

28. Cooley, supra note 19, at 117.
29. Wolf Wolfensberger, The Nature and Origin of Our Institutional Models (Syracuse, N.Y.:

Human Policy Press, 1975).
30. Id. See Marvin Rosch, Gerald R. Clark, & Marvin S. Kivitz, eds., The History of Mental
Retardation (Baltimore, Md.: University Park Press, 1976); Leo Kanner, A History of the Care and
Study of the Mentally Retarded (Springfield, Ill.: Charles C. Thomas, Publisher, 1964); Kathleen
Jones, A History of the Mental Health Services 182-225 (Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, Ltd.,
1972); Albert Deutsch, The Mentally Ill in America: A History of Their Care and Treatment from
Colonial Times 332-86 (2d ed. rev. & enl. New York: Columbia University Press, 1949).

31. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 283B, Comment b(3) at 17 (1965).
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mirrors the attitude of the early court decisions. 2 But the unwillingness
to accept the full liberty of mentally disabled people should not be attributed to a mere lack of charity or sympathy on the part of the courts
that adopted the objective standard. The conventional wisdom of the
time, buttressed by what appeared to be a substantial body of scientific
opinion, held that mentally ill and mentally retarded people constituted a
grave threat to society. It is not surprising that such an atmosphere would
foster a rule that refused to absolve such persons from compensating victims for the damage they caused.
Another common rationale for courts' adoption of the objective rule is
the argument that a subjective rule would invite tortfeasors to feign insanity or retardation in order to escape liability. Whereas the previous
argument was a guard against the evil done by the mentally disabled
themselves, this view urged similar caution against those who might falsely claim such disability. To evaluate the continuing validity of this rationale, two separate issues must be considered.
The first consideration is whether current scientific and medical knowledge have advanced sufficiently to allow more accurate diagnosis and
thus detection of false claims of disability. It is certainly true that the understanding of mental illness and retardation at the time of the formulation and adoption of the objective rule was much more primitive than
our current state of knowledge. Great effort has been expended to advance our understanding of the etiology and course of various kinds of
mental disability. The subtlety and complexity of the classification systems currently used by professionals suggest the scope of the advances
made in the last half-century. 3
There has been some suggestion that these advances may warrant reconsideration of the objective rule because uncertainty of diagnosis has
been reduced so substantially. 3 ' Whether these advances have been sufficient to outweigh the fear of uncertainty in individual cases is open to
debate. Despite the elaborate structure of the American Psychiatric Association's new classification system, it remains true that diagnosis of mental illness is a most imprecise exercise. And while mental retardation
might appear to be more amenable to objective measurement since a
32. While resistance to the notion of mentally ill and mentally retarded people living at liberty in

the community has not vanished, its expression in law seems an anachronism in an era when legal
rights of mentally disabled people have expanded so dramatically. Thus the court's reference to this
rationale, citing the Restatement's commentary, is particularly jarring in the recent case of
Schumann v. Crofoot, 43 Or. App. 53, 602 P.2d 298, 300 (1979).
33. Grossman, supra note 16; American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders (3d ed. Washington, D.C.: American Psychiatric Association, 1980).
34. "Although this factor may be of decreasing importance with the continued development of
medical and psychiatric science, it remains at the present time a major obstacle to any allowance for
mental deficiency." Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 283B, Comment b(2) at 17 (1965).
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quantifiable measure (the IQscore) is potentially available for each individual, this precision is more apparent than real. Mental retardation consists of a combination of subaverage intellectual functioning with substantial problems in adaptive behavior," and each of these elements may
be open to debate in any individual case. 6 Perhaps the best conclusion
that can be reached is that many individuals can be identified with some
certainty as mentally ill or mentally retarded but that for a substantial
number expert opinion is unlikely to be unanimous.
In evaluating the argument about feigned disability, we must consider
not only the state of the diagnostic art but also the likelihood that a significant number of tort defendants would seek the protection of a false
claim of mental disability. There appear to be no directly applicable empirical data on this issue. It will certainly be contended that the existence
of questionable claims of insanity by criminal defendants indicates that a
subjective standard in tort law would produce similar results. However, it
is not intuitively obvious that the criminal law's experience would be repeated. A label of mental illness or mental retardation carries with it a
substantial stigma in our society. While some criminal defendants may be
willing to assume the stigmatizing effect of such a label in order to escape
the death penalty or even lengthy imprisonment, it does not necessarily
follow that tort defendants would be equally willing when money damages are the only penalty at issue. The fact that many tort defendants are
substantially insured to cover the cost of an adverse judgment further
mitigates the concern about false claims of mental disability. Perhaps the
experience of contract law would be as useful for comparison as the criminal defense analogy; it has not been contended that the rule that mentally incompetent people may escape some of the obligations of their contracts has led to a large number of false claims of mental incapacity. It
seems unlikely that false claims by tort defendants would present an insurmountable problem if a subjective tort standard were thought otherwise desirable.
A more serious concern is the contention that a subjective rule would
be unmanageable because of the subtle variations of intelligence, temperament, and emotional balance which are common to all people and thus
to all tort defendants. This argument contends that since we hold defendants who have unusually slow reflexes to the standard of the averagereflex reasonable person, it is no more unfair to hold the mentally deficient defendant to the standard of the mentally typical citizen. Holmes's
35. Grossman, supra note 16.
36. Disabilities in adaptive behavior are, not surprisingly, quite difficult to quantify. But disputes
may also arise concerning the measurement of intellectual ability, such as the appropriateness of the
chosen test to the status of the individual litigant and the proper interpretation of the resulting score.
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frequently quoted explanation of the reasonable person standard makes
the point:
The law takes no account of the infinite varieties of temperament, intellect,
and education which make the internal character of a given act so different
in different men. It does not attempt to see men as God sees them, for
more than one sufficient reason. . . . (W)hen men live in society, a certain average of conduct, a sacrifice of individual peculiarities going beyond
a certain point, is necessary to the general welfare. If, for instance, a man
is born hasty and awkward, is always having accidents and hurting himself
or his neighbors, no doubt his congenital defects will be allowed for in the
courts of Heaven, but his slips are no less troublesome to his neighbors
than if they sprang from guilty neglect."
Inevitably, an objective tort standard sacrifices fairness to those defendants who were incapable of meeting that standard but who did their subjective best, in favor of compensating plaintiffs where a typical person in
the defendant's situation would have had sufficient skill to avoid the injury. Proponents of the objective standard for mentally disabled defendants can argue that its relaxation would introduce into tort law new inequities between mentally disabled defendants, who would escape liability,
and defendants whose disability (e.g., congenital awkwardness accompanied by typical or superior intelligence) was not in the category afforded subjective treatment in the courts.
Debate on this point would be more clear-cut if other instances of subjectivity had not already been introduced into negligence law-for example, children and physically disabled people.38 In making allowances for
these particularly appealing tort defendants, the law has abandoned a
stance in which full equity can be achieved short of adoption of a subjective standard for all defendants, no matter what sort of uncontrollable
disability they might claim (poor education, absent-mindedness, pathological lack of consideration for their fellow human beings, or whatever).
Since the law certainly is unwilling to go this far in accommodating the
varieties of human nature (both for administrative reasons and because
of the presumed reduction in compensation to injured plaintiffs), any
claim for a subjective standard for mentally disabled defendants will have
to stand on a perception of extraordinary injustice to such defendants
and on assurances that such a standard would not be unworkable.
This leads to the final point in defense of the objective standard-that
its abandonment would produce the same immense difficulties encountered by the criminal law in the administration of the insanity
37. Holmes, supra note 25, at 108.
38. Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 283A, 283C (1965). For a fuller discussion of analogies to
the physically handicapped and to children, see text accompanying notes 67-93 infra.
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defense. It has already been suggested39 that the fear of feigned-insanity
defenses in tort cases may not be warranted. But this does not eliminate
the overall comparison with the criminal defense, a comparison that is of
great concern to the courts."0 Even if every claim of mental disability
were raised by a tort defendant who truly believed himself entitled to the
defense, serious definitional problems would remain. What kinds of mental disability would be considered sufficient to provide a defense, and
what kinds would be viewed as mere variations within the normal range
and thus treated within the objective context? Here the parallel to the
criminal insanity defense is apt. Much ink has been spilled on the merits
of the M'Naghten rule (knowing right from wrong) as contrasted to an irresistible impulse rule, as contrasted to a "product of mental disease"
rule, as contrasted to other formulations and combinations.' The causal
link between the mental disability and the allegedly tortious behavior
must be established in any event, and that is a matter which is not
without its own difficulties of definition and proof. But among those
cases in which causation is established, it is likely that the law would demand (as it does in the criminal field) that the disability involved be of
sufficient magnitude or of a particular type to warrant exoneration from
responsibility for torts. Therefore individual cases would inevitably raise
issues of measurement and classification which would be difficult and
costly to resolve.
In answer to this argument, advocates of a subjective standard for the
mentally disabled must surely acknowledge the difficulties inherent in
such adjudications. But the criminal law is not the only context in which
an individual's mental state is relevant to litigation under current law.
Cases involving guardianship, commitment, testamentary capacity, and
numerous other areas call upon triers of fact to decide whether an individual's mental condition warrants (or warranted) treatment different
from that which the law affords to mentally typical persons. Both expert
testimony and the fact-finder's own common-sense understanding of the
individual's condition as illuminated by the evidence are commonly
brought to bear in deciding these cases. Such adjudication is seldom neat
or clear-cut, but the law has proven tolerant of a certain amount of
evidentiary and doctrinal untidiness in the area of mental health law, if
only because it has discovered no practical alternative that is at the same
time fair to mentally disabled people. Proponents of a subjective stan-

39. See text accompanying notes 33-35 supra.
40. E.g., Jolley v. Powell, 299 So. 2d 647, 649 (Fla. App. 1974).
41. Among the best discussions is Abraham Samuel Goldstein, The Insanity Defense (New
Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1967).
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dard can argue that a new rule would offer no greater difficulties than are
encountered in these old civil contexts.
In conclusion, it cannot be denied that the original policy rationales
that led to the adoption of the objective standard and the rejection of an
"insanity defense" in tort cases have been substantially weakened by a
variety of legal and scientific developments in recent years. But it is also
true that changing the rule to a subjective standard would carry difficulties of administration, and these will appear sufficient to some observers to support retention of the old rule even without its original supporting arguments. Others will disagree. But a reconsideration of this
question cannot rest on the outcome of this debate alone, because related
tort doctrines concerning the actions of tort plaintiffs have also been
undergoing change, and the effect of these changes must also be weighed
in the balance.
III. CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE AND COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE

A. The Subjective Standard for Contributory Negligence
Given the longevity and near unanimity of the American rule that mentally disabled people are responsible for the torts they commit, it is somewhat surprising that courts have been nearly as unanimous in reaching a
quite different conclusion in cases of alleged contributory negligence. At
least for those mentally disabled plaintiffs who are "totally insane" the
standard of care (self-protection) for claimed contributory negligence will
be gauged to their individual capability.42 Thus the courts have created an
objective rule for defendants, while for at least a substantial number of
plaintiffs they have fashioned a subjective standard.
A subjective test for contributory negligence of mentally disabled
plaintiffs first appeared as dicta during the last century.43 Its adoption,
also in dicta, by the Supreme Court in 1900, and more clearly by the
Ninth Circuit in 1911, 45 was followed by general acceptance in American
courts. As announced in the Ninth Circuit case, the general principle is
that plaintiffs who lack the average adult's intelligence and capacity to
42. E.g., Noel v. McCaig, 174 Kan. 677, 258 P.2d 234 (1953); Emory University v. Lee, 97 Ga.
App. 680, 104 S.E. 2d 234 (1958). See Note, Contributory Negligence of Incompetents, 3 Washburn
L.J. 215 (1964).
43. E.g., Boland v. Missouri R.R., 36 Mo. 484 (1865) (dicta regarding mental disability; the case
dealt with a young child); Chicago & Alton R.R. v. Becker, 76 Ill. 25 (1875).
44. Baltimore & Potomac R.R. v. Cumberland, 176 U.S. 232 (1900) (this case also involved a
child).
45. Seattle Electric Co. v. Hovden 190 F.7 (9th Cir. 1911). This case did involve an adult who appears to have been mentally retarded, but the statement of the rule, while clear, is technically dictum
because the court also concludes that plaintiff's actions would not have been contributorily negligent
"even if she had been possessed of ordinary capacity and intelligence." 190 F. at 9.
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care for themselves will be held to the exercise of only such capability as
they actually possess. 4 Although some other courts have extended this
subjective standard to only a subclass of mentally disabled plaintiffs, 7
the abandonment of the reasonable person test for at least some mentally
ill and retarded litigants is well accepted.
Why the courts have chosen to treat mentally disabled plaintiffs so differently from similarly situated defendants has not been explained clearly. One suggestion is that the policy rationales underlying the objective
standard for a defendant's liability are less applicable in cases of claimed
contributory negligence.4 8 This may be true for those rationales that are
related to the strict liability origins of the rule (e.g., that the mentally
disabled should pay for the damage they cause), but the differences between disabled plaintiffs and defendants are less clear when the courts are
concerned with administrative issues (feigned insanity, definition of sufficient disability to fall within the subjective rule, and the courts' painful
experience with the criminal insanity defense). But since the modern persuasiveness of the combined policy rationales for the objective standard
is less than overwhelming, their lack of congruence in contributory
negligence cases seems an insufficient explanation for what are essentially
opposite rules.
A more likely explanation may derive from the view that contributory
negligence is essentially an equitable bar against plaintiffs with "unclean"
hands."4' 9 Since an injured plaintiff who failed to protect himself because
of mental disability cannot be said to be morally unworthy of the court's
solicitude, compensating this "innocent" plaintiff from the purse of a
"guilty" defendant produces little equitable discomfort. Since the doctrine of contributory negligence has long labored under criticism that it
produces harsh results,5 0 the courts may have been willing to adopt a subjective standard for mentally disabled plaintiffs in order to avoid one set
of harsh results for which there was little identifiable support in perceived
fairness or public policy.
A related interpretation suggests that the mentally disabled plaintiff
and defendant evoke very different degrees of sympathy from the court.
The mentally ill or retarded defendant has somehow been allowed to live
uncontrolled (or insufficiently controlled) in the world and has as a result
46. Id.

47. See text accompanying notes 52-64 infra.
48. The reasons "may not have the same force as applied to contributory negligence." Restatement (Second) of Torts § 464, Comment g at 509 (1965). See also, Comment, The Tort Liability of
Insane Persons for Negligence: A Critique, 39 Tenn. L. Rev. 705, 722 (1972).
49. For a discussion of the various theories of contributory negligence, see Prosser, supra note 26,

at 417-18.
50. Thus the current movement to replace contributory negligence with a system of comparative
negligence. See text accompanying note 65 infra.
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caused the kind of injury of which society is fearful. If that defendant
has a sufficient estate to pay a tort judgment, the court may not see him
as "entitled" to keep that money. 5 It may be money that he did not earn
(e.g., an inheritance) and it may be thought that it is money that he cannot profitably use (for if he is placed under greater control-i.e., in an institution-he will have no great "need" for funds). From such a perspective it may not seem unjust that that money be used to compensate the
disabled person's victim. The mentally disabled plaintiff presents a far
more sympathetic picture. He did not cause another person injury and
only "caused" his own in the sense that he was less able to protect
himself than a mentally typical person would have been. The potential
judgment constitutes money that he truly "needs" for such things as
medical bills occasioned by the injury. The plaintiff's disability, which
may be identical to the defendant's in the previous hypothetical example,
is considerably less threatening to society and may appear to have a
superior claim to the court's sympathy.
Whatever the true explanation for the existence of a subjective standard in contributory negligence cases, the rule stands as a sharp and
puzzling contrast to the standard for defendants.
B. Dispute Over the "Partially Disabled" Plaintiff
The fact that the courts have been nearly unanimous in fashioning a
subjective test for contributory negligence should not be allowed to
obscure the fact that jurisdictions differ as to which mentally disabled
plaintiffs are entitled to its protection. Beginning with early cases that involved injuries to mentally disabled workers at their place of employment,12 some American courts have extended the benefits of the subjective standard to plaintiffs who are "totally insane" or "utterly devoid of
intelligence" 3 but have denied them to individuals whose disability falls
somewhat short of those characterizations.
In a leading early case, Worthington v. Mencer," the Alabama Supreme Court reversed a judgment for an injured worker who had claimed
mental disability in response to a defense of contributory negligence. The
court stated:
51. "[I]t is better that their wealth, if any, should be used to compensate innocent victims than
that it should remain in their hands." Schumann v. Crofoot, 43 Or. App. 53, 602 P.2d 298, 301
(1979), citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 283B, comment b (1965).
52. E.g., Deisenrieter v. Kraus-Merkel Malting Co., 97 Wis. 279, 72 N.W. 735 (1897); Georgia
Cotton-Oil Co. v. Jackson, 112 Ga. 620, 37 S.E. 873 (1901).
53. In most of the cases, the terminology is imprecise. Some courts appear to believe that some
level of mental retardation can be labeled "devoid of intelligence" and some level of mental illness
can be identified as "total insanity." See note 16 supra. No case appears to rest any distinction on
the difference between mental illness and mental retardation.
54. Worthington v. Mencer, 96 Ala. 310, 11 So. 72 (1892).
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The plaintiff is to be held to the exercise of the degree of care of which he
was capable. If he was merely a person of dull mind, who could labor for
his own livelihood, and there was no apparent necessity of putting him
under the protection of a guardian to keep him out of harm's way, he is
chargeable with the same degree of care for his personal safety as one of
brighter intellect, as any attempt to frame varying rules of responsibility to
varying degrees of intelligence would necessarily involve confusion and
uncertainty in the law. If, on the other hand, he was so absolutely devoid
of intelligence as to be unable to apprehend apparent danger, and to avoid
exposure to it, he cannot be said to have been guilty of negligence, because
he was incapable of exercising care."
Thus the reason for limiting plaintiffs' access to the subjective test were
similar to the reasons for its rejection when claimed by mentally disabled
defendants.
But the Alabama court's explanation also reveals other considerations.
The "person [plaintiff] of dull mind" mentioned by the court cannot
avail himself of the subjective test because he is capable of working for a
living and is not in need of a guardian or the protection of an institution.
Except for the court's mention of "confusion" and "uncertainty," the
relevance of a plaintiff's employability is not readily apparent. But in the
final quoted sentence, the court may offer clarification. It states that persons with greater disability ("absolutely devoid of intelligence") are
unable to recognize potentially dangerous situations and to protect
themselves. This suggests that the court's reluctance to compensate the
less disabled plaintiff may spring from disbelief that his failure to protect
himself was the result of his disability. The more severely disabled are
"incapable of exercising care." This may imply that the less disabled are
not entitled to protection from a defense of contributory negligence
because they probably were, in fact, contributorily negligent, even if
measured by a subjective standard.
The same skepticism about the relationship between plaintiff's disability and the accident can be seen in the recent case of Fox v. City and
County of San Francisco." Mr. Fox, a mentally retarded adult, was injured when his bicycle collided with a municipal bus. The Court of Appeal reversed a judgment for plaintiff and discussed the appropriate standard of care for retarded plaintiffs at some length. It concluded that an
objective standard was appropriate to the facts of that case because the
plaintiff's testimony indicated that he understood the rules of the road
and because the bus driver had no way of knowing that plaintiff was
mentally retarded. Mr. Fox's knowledge of highway rules can only be
55. Worthington v. Mencer, 96 Ala. 310, 11 So. at 73-74.
56. Fox v. City and County of San Francisco, 47 Cal. App. 3d 164, 120 Cal. Rptr. 779 (1975).
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relevant if the court adopts a dichotomous rule that applies an objective
standard to the partially disabled (presumably including Mr. Fox) and a
subjective standard for those more severely disabled. But perhaps a better
interpretation of the fact's relevance is that it establishes that Mr. Fox's
disability was not related to his failure to avoid the accident. While the
court appears to use the plaintiff's knowledge as support for holding him
to an objective standard, it may be more closely related to the actual
holding of the case, which relates to causation:
[T]here is no evidence in the record to support the conclusion that impaired
faculties, mental or physical, played any part in causing the collision between the bicycle and the bus. Unless we assume that one's rating on the
intelligence chart necessarily plays a part in every accident in which he
becomes involved there is no justification
in the instant case for giving the
7
impaired faculties instruction.Courts faced with cases like Fox have agonized over the choice of an appropriate standard of conduct for plaintiffs, and many have chosen the
dichotomous rule for reasons that do not demonstrate the inapplicability
of a subjective rule to all mentally disabled plaintiffs.
Courts adopting the dichotomous rule appear fearful that if all mentally ill and retarded plaintiffs were held only to a subjective standard of
care, they would be able to collect damages for accidents that they could,
in fact, have avoided. The concern here is not so much that litigants will
feign mental disability as that they will falsely claim that their disability
prevented them from taking precautions of which they were, in fact,
capable. This concern is not, of course, logically related to the choice between the objective and subjective standard. Even if the subjective standard is applied to a given plaintiff, he will not be absolved from contributory negligence unless it can be shown that his disability "produced"
his deficient conduct-that he could not have taken the actions necessary
for his protection."8 The courts' uneasiness about truly negligent plain57. Fox v. City and County of San Francisco, 47 Cal. App. 3d 164, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 784-85.
58. A similar problem has arisen in cases in which druggists are sued for selling the poison with
which a mentally ill person attempted or committed suicide. The courts in two cases discussed this as
a question of proximate cause. Eckerd's Inc. v. McGhee, 19 Tenn. App. 277, 86 S.W.2d 570 (1935);
Riesbeck Drug. Co. v. Wray, II1 Ind. App. 467, 39 N.E.2d 776 (1942). A more straightforward approach (which the courts also pursued in these cases) is to inquire into the disabled person's ability to
avoid the injury and thus bring the cases within the framework of contributory negligence.
A more numerous group of cases with somewhat similar fact patterns have chosen to use the contributory negligence analysis. These cases involve the alleged liability of mental institutions for
failure to protect patients from self-inflicted harm. These cases are characterized by their solicitude
toward the claims of the mentally disabled plaintiffs and focus on the defendants' knowledge of the
plaintiffs' disabilities and their special duty to protect them from harm. Among the leading cases in
this group are Mochen v. State, 43 A.D.2d 484, 352 N.Y.S.2d 290 (1974) (involving a mentally ill
teenager); Avey v. St. Francis Hosp. 201 Kan. 687, 442 P.2d 1013 (1968). Similar facts were analyzed under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in Vistica v. Presbyterian Hosp. & Medical Center, 67
Cal. 2d 465, 432 P.2d 193, 62 Cal. Rptr. 577 (1967).
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tiffs should not be "resolved" by creating a subclass of plaintiffs for
whom the issue of "actual negligent conduct" is rendered irrelevant by
application of an objective standard.
But whatever the strength of the rationale for a dichotomous rule for
contributory negligence, its adoption entails serious administrative difficulties. The main problem is the obvious one of line drawing. The dividing line between "total insanity" and the lesser forms of mental disability
may have seemed clear enough to earlier generations of courts. The complexity and subtlety of the various forms of mental illness and mental retardation have now been demonstrated. Establishing a rule that classifies
all disabilities into two categories on the basis of severity can be accomplished only by intellectual brute force. To date, no courts have made the
attempt.
Should it be thought desirable to create such dividing lines, few possibilities suggest themselves. In the area of mental illness, courts might be
tempted to use the demarcation between the psychoses and the neuroses
as the division between those disabilities for which a subjective test is employed and those falling under the objective standard. But such a division's clarity would be more apparent than real. Major psychotic disorders have parallel neuroses that manifest many of the same symptoms. 9 And it will not be the rare case in which each side could produce
expert witnesses testifying that the plaintiff's mental disorder was on the
advantageous side of the line of demarcation. A casual perusal of the
American Psychiatric Association's Diagnosticand StatisticalManual of
Mental Disorders0 would be likely to convince most observers that such
a division would increase rather than decrease the confusion and uncertainty about which the Worthington court was concerned."
Similarly, a dividing line in mental retardation cannot be chosen without cost. This task would appear on the surface to be easier, since all
forms of mental retardation, regardless of etiology, can be categorized on
a single scale of severity. 2 Thus all mentally retarded people can be categorized, with whatever degree of accuracy, as mildly, moderately, severely, or profoundly retarded. Courts might thus choose to apply the subjective standard only to those retarded people whose disability falls within
the severe and profound categories. But as in the case of mental illness,
such a solution does not offer either theoretical clarity or ease of administration and implementation. The categorization of retarded people into
the four groups papers over important and complex aspects of their dis59. See David Shapiro, Neurotic Styles (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1965).

60. American Psychiatric Association, supra note 33.
61. See text accompanying notes 54-55 supra.
62. See note 16 supra.
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ability. As has been noted, retardation is a combination of subaverage intellectual functioning with substantial deficits in adaptive behavior.6 3 A
given plaintiff may have intellectual impairment so substantial that it falls
within the severe or profound category, but his adaptive behavior may be
less seriously affected. Or the reverse may be true. In some tort cases the
plaintiff's academic abilities may be more relevant, and in others it may
be behavioral factors that are at issue; in a substantialnumber of cases
the relevance of individual factors may be unclear. A dichotomous rule
must ignore such subtleties. In addition, various tests are used to measure
retardation, and the same test may produce different interpretations in
the hands of different professionals. 64 Thus the rule would certainly produce cases in which expert witnesses disagreed about whether the plaintiff
fell on the moderate or severe side of the dividing line. Such testimony
would do little to illuminate issues relevant to a fair resolution of the tort
case at hand.
In conclusion, it is clear that a dichotomous rule, if applied to a substantial number of litigated cases, would prove difficult to administer. It
would invite dispute about difficult technical issues that had little to do
with the plaintiff's disability and its relationship to his failure to avoid
the accident.
C. Comparative Negligence
The radically different treatment afforded mentally disabled plaintiffs
and defendants under current law may be even more awkward in those
jurisdictions that have adopted comparative negligence. A majority of
the states have now either enacted by statute or adopted by judicial decision some form of comparative fault to replace the defense of contributory negligence. 61 Under comparative negligence, the relative responsibility of plaintiff and defendant for the injury of the former is ascertained by the fact-finder, and the cost of the injury is apportioned accordingly.
No court has addressed the issue of the impact of comparative negligence on the standard of care for mentally disabled litigants. 66 In dealing
63. Id.
64. A good introduction to the variety of intelligence tests and their uses is found in Halbert B.
Robinson & Nancy M. Robinson, The Mentally Retarded Child (rev. ed. New York: McGraw-Hill
Book Co., 1976).
65. In 1980, Professor Goldberg counted 33 states that had adopted some form of comparative
negligence. Joseph Goldberg, Judicial Adoption of Comparative Fault in New Mexico: The Time Is
at Hand, 10 N.M.L. Rev. 3, 7 (1979-80). Since that time the total has reached at least 35. Claymore
v. City of Albuquerque, 20 N.M. St. B. Bull. 289 (Feb. 12, 1981); Alvis v. Ribar, 85 Ill. 2d 1, 421
N.E.2d 886 (1981).
66. Several cases involving mentally disabled litigants have arisen in comparative negligence
jurisdictions, but none addresses the question of apportionment of responsibility and the standard of
care for the disabled. See Bruenig v. American Family Ins. Co., 45 Wis. 2d 536, 173 N.W.2d 619
(1970); Warner v. Kiowa County Hosp. Auth., 551 P.2d 1179 (Okla. App. 1976); Miller v. Trinity
Medical Center, 260 N.W.2d 4 (N.D. 1977).
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with mentally disabled plaintiffs and defendants, courts appear willing to
retain the double standard that their jurisdictions adopted under the
regime of contributory negligence. Comparative negligence is not totally
incompatible with this double standard, and the low number of appealed
cases involving the mentally disabled may have made it unnecessary for
courts to reconsider this rule. But two factors suggest that such reconsideration might be warranted in comparative fault states.
The first factor is the doctrinal basis of comparative negligence. The
allocation of responsibility between the litigants can be seen as the ultimate culmination of the fault ideology in tort law. The system calls for a
party to be compensated and/or forced to pay in proportion to the extent
of the involved parties' fault. Viewed in this light, it would seem ironic to
retain the objective standard for mentally disabled people since that standard is an ill-disguised version of strict liability. It is less than fully convincing to say that a mentally disabled defendant is 70 percent at fault
(and thus must pay 70 percent of the damages) because a reasonable
(nondisabled) person who acted as the defendant did would have been 70
percent at fault for a similar accident. An objective standard for either
plaintiffs or defendants requires the jury to ascertain the degree of a disabled person's responsibility, in pseudo-quantitative terms, for actions
over which he had no control. If not incompatible, comparative negligence and the objective standard are at least doctrinally discordant.
The second consideration also relates to the jury's task of allocating responsibility. In cases (most frequently automobile accidents) in which
each party sues the other for injuries sustained in the same accident, the
double standard between plaintiffs and defendants is at least somewhat
awkward. If it finds that both parties contributed to the accident, the
jury will have to apportion the responsibility of each party for both his
own injury and that of his opponent. In a case in which one party is mentally disabled, the jury will be asked to decide the question of his responsibility for the other party's injury by an objective standard and must
then evaluate the same behavior by a subjective standard to determine its
role in causing his own injury. Of course, juries in contributory negligence states will have to undertake the same task in cases involving injuries to both parties. But the comparative negligence system's requirement that the fact-finder apportion each party's responsibility highlights
the incongruity of evaluating the same actions by two different standards
to decide on responsibility for different injuries arising out of the same
accident.67
67. This incongruity is not unique to cases involving mentally disabled litigants. Courts in comparative negligence jurisdictions have had to consider the appropriateness of utilizing the comparative fault doctrine in products liability cases. E.g., Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d
725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1978). The concurring and dissenting opinions in Daly raise
many of the same problems considered here in the context of mental disability, but the majority con-
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Adoption of comparative negligence does not affect other considerations in the choice between the objective and subjective rules, such as the
possibility of fraudulent claims of disability and the specter of the administrative difficulties encountered by the criminal courts. But the doctrinal
basis for the objective standard is weakened in comparative negligence
states, and the incongruity of treating plaintiffs and defendants differently is more visible and is equally difficult to justify. Therefore it can be
argued that the adoption of comparative fault affords an opportunity to
consider the desirability of a subjective standard for all mentally disabled
litigants in negligence cases.
IV. THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE
MENTALLY DISABLED, RECONSIDERED

It is impossible to resolve the issue of the appropriate standard of care
for mentally ill and retarded persons without considering their proper
standing in society and before the law. Analogies to physically disabled
adults and to children must be considered, although neither is perfectly
apt. And finally, the question of rights and responsibilities must be raised
anew.

A. Analogy to the Physically Handicapped
The standard of care for physically disabled persons is generally that of
a reasonable person "under like disability." 68 This subjective test means
that a paraplegic will not be held to the same abilities as an able-bodied
person but will be required to make the same allowances a reasonable
paraplegic would make. Thus the physically handicapped are not required to take what would be for them impossible measures for their own
protection or for the protection of others.
Several possible reasons can be offered for the difference between the
rule for the physically handicapped and that for the mentally disabled.
The American Law Institute suggests that the major facts are public acceptance and administrative convenience:

The explanation for the distinction between such physical illness and the
mental illness dealt with in § 283B probably lies in the greater public

cluded that the jury would be able to apportion responsibility even when required to utilize different
standards (strict liability for defendant manufacturer and the reasonable person standard for the
"contributory" negligence of plaintiff). Viewed from another perspective, the difficulty in using two
different standards may say less about the appropriateness of those standards than it says about the
conceptual difficulties inherent in the operation of the comparative negligence doctrine itself.
68. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 283C (1965).
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familiarity with the former, and the comparative ease and certainty with
which it can be proved."
Because of the sharp disparity in the treatment of these two groups under
tort law, each of these factors merits closer inspection.
The question of public acceptance presents subtle shadings of difference between perceptions of the two groups. Both mentally and physically handicapped persons are the objects of public concern, largesse, and
sympathy. Legislation to assist these groups often treats them similarly
and together. 70 A popular image projected by both groups is the sympathy-inducing face of the poster child. But in the case of the mentally
disabled, this sympathetic attitude has not always been the dominant
public sentiment. As noted earlier 71 mentally disabled people were
thought to be a major threat to society in the early years of this century.
And while the eugenics scare has subsided with the advent of more scientific knowledge about the genetic transmission of mental disability, the
previous era of fear has left two relevant legacies. The first is the body of
laws designed to restrict the lives of mentally handicapped people in
society.7 2 The objective rule of tort liability can be viewed as a minor element in that legislative heritage. The second legacy is a residual fear and
discomfort about the mentally disabled. Such fears, although less virulent
than they were in the early 1900s, manifest themselves in the form of opposition to creating group homes in residential neighborhoods 7" and the
current backlash against the practice of "mainstreaming" mentally handicapped children in public school classrooms. 74 Disorders of the mind remain a source of fear and apprehension in the popular media. This negative side of society's current ambivalence toward the mentally ill and
mentally retarded may be what the American Law Institute has in mind
when it refers to the public's "greater familiarity" with physical handi75
caps.
69. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 283C, Comment b (1965).
70. Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773, 20
U.S.C.A. §§ 1401-61 (West 1978); Rehabilitation, Comprehensive Services, and Developmental
Disabilities Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-602, 92 Stat. 2955, 29 U.S.C.A. § 706(7)(B) (West
1980 Supp.).
71. See text accompanying notes 29 and 30 supra.
72. See generally Paul R. Friedman, The Rights of Mentally Retarded Persons (New York: Avon
Books, Discus Books, 1976); Patricia M. Wald, Basic Personal and Civil Rights, in President's
Committee on Mental Retardation, supra note 5 at 3.
73. Robinsue Frohboese & Bruce Sales, Parental Opposition to Deinstitutionalization: A
Challenge in Need of Attention and Resolution, 4 Law & Human Behavior 1 (1980); Robert B.
Kugel & Ann Shearer, eds., Changing Patterns in Residential Services for the Mentally Retarded
(rev. ed. Washington, D.C.: President's Committee on Mental Retardation, 1976).
74. Id.
75. See generally Robert B. Edgerton, The Cloak of Competence: Stigma in the Lives of the Mentally Retarded (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967). For a comparative view of American
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Granted that there is a difference in public attitude toward physical
and mental handicaps, the relevance of that difference to the tort standard is less than perfectly clear. The ALI's discussion of "public familiarity" would explain the differences if the rules were a creation of juries,
but juries only apply a standard they receive from judges. One possible
interpretation of the Am comment is that judges, as members of the public, are less familiar with mental disability and are therefore less willing to
include them within the subjective standard. The other available interpretation is that judges, as public officials, believe that the average citizen
would react unfavorably to the extension of a subjective test to the mentally disabled. Since our system of justice is supposed to reflect the
societal consensus of what is fair and equitable, it may be thought that
the general public would be offended by a system that denied recovery to
plaintiffs injured by mentally disabled persons who were unable to perform at the high standard of care of the reasonable person. Empirical
data on this point are unavailable, but it is at least conceivable that public
sentiment is more sympathetic toward physically disabled defendants
than to their mentally disabled counterparts. Whether that difference in
degrees of sympathy is sufficient to support the different standards of
care applied to the two groups is open to debate.
The other rationale offered by the Am is that a physical handicap can
be identified with greater ease and certainty than mental disability. Thus
the courts that fear the replication of the difficulties that accompany the
insanity defense in criminal law76 are less concerned that similar administrative and evidentiary problems will arise in cases involving the physically handicapped. It is certainly true that deafness, blindness, and quadriplegia in litigants are easier to ascertain than the subtler forms of mental
illness. On the other hand, severe or profound mental retardation may
present fewer proof problems than partial hearing loss, restricted vision,
or a neurological condition that retards physical reflexes.
Whether mental and physical handicaps are so similar that they should
be treated in similar fashion by the tort law remains debatable. In considering this question, it should be remembered that the form of the subjective standard for the physically disabled incorporates the individual's
knowledge of his own handicap. Thus a blind person is required to act as
a reasonable blind person would act, which includes taking his own
blindness into account in planning his activities. The ability to plan
"around" the disability will be available less frequently for mentally disand European attitudes, see Leopold Lippman, Attitudes Toward the Handicapped: Comparison
Between Europe and the United States (Springfield, Ill.: Charles C. Thomas, Publisher, 1972).
76. See text accompanying notes 39-41.
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abled persons. The fact that it is the individual's mind that is affected will
reduce the occasions when the person can identify that his disability is
likely to create hazardous situations for himself or others. Such occasions
are not impossible in all cases-a retarded person may know that his
disability makes it unwise to engage in a particular activity that his teaching suggests is associated with danger. But such instances will be rarer for
the mentally retarded and mentally ill than they are for the physically
handicapped who suffer no substantial mental impairment. 77 A subjective
standard for the mentally handicapped could include the same sort of
limitation, but "the reasonable person with similar mental handicap" is a
formulation that is at least initially confusing for courts and juries, and
there will be many cases in which it would not represent any modification
of the pure subjective standard-"what was this individual capable of
doing to avoid the injury?"
The one judicial attempt to draw an analogy between the physically
and mentally disabled is so limited in scope that it does not serve as a very
useful indicator of the possible utility of the analogy on a wider scale. In
Bruenig v. American Family Insurance Co.,"s the Wisconsin Supreme
Court decided that while the objective standard would continue to apply
to most cases of mental disability, cases involving sudden onset of insanity should be analogized to sudden heart attacks that cause accidents.
Thus when the sufferer of either of these disabilities has no warning of its
likelihood (presumably measured by a previous occurrence or other medical indication that the person was prone to such attacks) he will be absolved from responsibility for a resulting accident on the theory that he
could not have avoided it. 7" Bruenig remains a less than satisfactory resolution not because it deals unfairly with the person who suffers a sudden
attack of insanity (such as a compelling delusion) or with his "victim"
but rather because its attempt to distinguish these cases from others involving less sudden mental disability is unpersuasive. This distinction fails
because it presupposes that only those whose mental handicap is of sudden onset are in fact unable to control their actions. Common experience
77. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court grappled with a similar issue in determining the

appropriate test for substituted judgment when a profoundly retarded man was proposed for lifeprolonging (but not life-saving) chemotherapy for leukemia. The court ruled that the substitute decision maker should decide as the disabled person would have decided for himself if competent and if

he were able to take into account the effects of his own incompetence. Superintendent of Belchertown v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977).
78. 45 Wis. 2d 536, 173 N.W.2d 619 (1970).
79. Accord, Buckley and Toronto Transp. Comm'n. v. Smith Transp., Ltd., 1946 Ont. L. Rep.
798, [1946] 4 D. L. Rep. 721 (1946). Other courts in the United States have reached the opposite conclusion and ruled that no exception to the objective standard is warranted. Sforza v. Green Bus
Lines, Inc. 150 Misc. 180, 268 N.Y.S. 446 (1934); Kuhn v. Zabotsky, 9 Ohio St. 2d 129, 224 N.E.2d

137 (1967).
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suggests that many mentally ill and mentally retarded persons whose condition has been previously diagnosed and identified remain incapable of
taking their disability into account sufficiently to conform their actions
to a modified reasonable person standard. The Bruenig court's analogy
to those suffering sudden physical disability is a less than satisfactory
half-measure that carves out an exception to the objective standard for
only a few mentally disabled defendants. But it does so based on a policy
that, if applied evenhandedly, would result in a subjective standard for
the vast majority of mentally handicapped defendants.
B. Analogy to Children
Even greater conceptual and ideological difficulties arise when one attempts to analogize the negligence standard of mentally disabled adults to
that of mentally typical children. Yet despite these difficulties, the comparison remains attractive, if not seductive, and courts should analyze the
issue carefully before deciding whether to employ the analogy.
The general rule is that children are held to a subjective standard. It is
most frequently stated as that conduct which it is reasonable to expect of
children "of like age, intelligence, and experience." 8 " This subjective rule
emerged only after the courts had long rejected the notion of immunity
of infants for their torts."1 It developed first in contributory negligence
cases and was then extended to those cases in which children were the defendants.8 2 In contrast to the objective standard for adult defendants, it
requires more than average care from the child of superior ability and less
from the child of limited ability. Our attention is drawn, of course, to the
latter aspect of the standard. 3
The subjective rule for children is defended by the American Law Institute as a sympathetic doctrine that presents no great difficulties of administration:
The special standard to be applied in the case of children arises out of the
public interest in their welfare and protection, together with the fact that
there is a wide basis of community experience upon which it is possible, as
a practical matter, to determine what is to be expected of themn."
As was noted in the previous section, public attitudes about the mentally
ill and mentally retarded have included substantial elements of fear and
80. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 283A (1965).
81. Prosser, supra note 26, at 996.
82. See 2 Fowler V. Harper & Fleming James, Jr., The Law of Torts 926 (Boston: Little, Brown
& Co., 1956); Prosser, supra note 26, at 156.

83. For adults of superior ability, the only exception to the objective reasonable person standard
is that some professionals, such as surgeons, will be held to the standard expected of their similarly
situated colleagues, rather than to the lay person's knowledge of anatomy, for example.

84. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 283A, Comment b (1965).
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revulsion, and even today's enlightened attitudes are not without a certain amount of ambivalence, so it can be argued that "the public interest
in their welfare and protection" is less emphatic than is true in cases involving children. Nevertheless, it is difficult to deny that there has developed some sort of consensus that mentally disabled people are entitled to
public concern and some form of protection. Therefore, the first element
of the Restatement's defense seems insufficient to distinguish the case of
the mentally handicapped adult.
The second element of that defense-that a subjective test may be administered practicably-presents the more substantial impediment to the
analogy. Commentary to the Restatement emphasizes that our common
experience provides sufficient information about what children of various
ages can be expected to do, thus rendering a subjective standard workable. It is certainly true that jurors are more likely to have informative experience about the abilities of children than they are about various forms
of mental disability. Therefore the key issue is whether expert testimony
can provide sufficient assistance to jurors to allow them to implement a
subjective test for mentally handicapped adults.
It is important to note that the child standard itself requires the jury to
inquire into the subjective state of children "of like

. . .

intelligence."

In a case involving a mentally retarded child, for example, the fact-finder
would have to determine what a reasonable child with intelligence comparable to the defendant's would have done in a similar situation. This
inquiry does not differ substantially from the question presented in the
case of a mentally retarded adult defendant if the latter were also to be
measured by a subjective standard. No greater degree of evidentiary complexity attends the case simply because the mentally retarded defendant
has attained majority. Nor is it likely that jurors' experience with mentally retarded children is significantly greater than their acquaintance with
mentally retarded adults; most jurors will have had little or no experience
with either. Thus, insofar as the mentally retarded are concerned, there
appears to be no valid argument against a subjective standard that does
not apply equally in cases involving children-cases that are already tried
under a subjective test.
Cases involving mental illness present somewhat different issues. The
Restatement's commentary on the child standard points out that the
phrase "of like

. . .

intelligence" does not refer to all aspects of mental

functioning:
"Intelligence" includes other mental capacities, but does not include judgment, which is an exercise of capacity rather than the capacity itself. The
fact that the child is mentally retarded, or that he is unusually bright for
his years, is to be taken into account; but once such account is taken, the
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child is still required to exercise the judgment of a reasonable person of
that intelligence. 5
To what extent are the distortions of normal mental functioning which
result from the various forms of mental illness to be attributed to substandard judgment? If the defendant in a negligence case suffers from a
delusion that his bodily movements are being controlled by someone
other than himself, should this factor be considered under the heading of
impaired judgment or under some other classification of mental pathology? Such line drawing is a difficult task for courts and one in which they
can anticipate little or no useful assistance from the expertise of the medical profession. While the psychiatric profession also talks about "impaired judgment,"8 6 the Restatement's concern focuses on a purely legal
issue.
The apparent purpose of this limitation is to disallow a defense that the
defendant habitually makes poor choices that result in accidents and
should thus be absolved from responsibility. This has analogies elsewhere
in the law. The subjective negligence standard for physically handicapped
adults will not be available to a defendant whose only claim is that he is
unusually accident prone. 7 Similarly, the criminal law has resisted extension of the insanity defense to "psychopaths" whose only manifestation
of mental illness is their habitual criminal behavior.88 Necessarily, the
claims of mental disability would require similar scrutiny under a subjective test, but this kind of inquiry is similar to cases that the courts already
handle in these other areas.
It would thus appear that implementation of a subjective standard of
care for mentally ill and mentally retarded defendants would not entail
difficulties beyond those that are already accepted under the subjective
standard applied to children.88 There remains, however, the question of
whether the similarities between the two groups are sufficient to persuade
the courts that they would be treated the same way by rules of responsibility for negligence.
85. Id. at 15.

86. See generally, American Psychiatric Association, supra note 33.
87. See generally, Fleming James, Jr. & John J. Dickinson, Accident Proneness and Accident
Law, 63 Harv. L. Rev. 769 (1950).
88. American Law Institute, Model Penal Code § 4.01(2) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962); but see
Wade v. United States, 426 F.2d 64 (9th Cir. 1970).
89. One problem that the courts have confronted in cases involving children is the matter of driving automobiles and other vehicles. Courts have generally concluded that when a child engages in
such "adult" activity, he will be held to an objective adult standard and will not be able to use the
defense that normally would be his because of his youth. Prosser, supranote 26, at 156-57. This rule
arose from concern about public safety. Similar concerns may be involved in the creation of a
similar exception to a subjective standard for mentally disabled adults-that they will not be excused
from negligence when they violate traffic laws. See Criez v. Sunset Motor Co., 123 Wash. 604, 213
P.7 (1923).
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The comparison of mentally retarded adults with children is particularly attractive. 9 Retarded adults are often viewed as persons whose
childhood mental development was slower than average and at some
point stopped short of the intellectual ability that other adults attain.
This manner of thinking about mentally retarded people is reinforced by
the availability of tests to measure the retarded person's intellectual skills
in terms of "mental age." This concept expresses the retarded
individual's mental ability in comparison to that of mentally typical
children. It accomplishes this by taking the individual's IQ score and
matching it with the chronological age at which mentally typical children

usually attain the same score. For example, an adult whose intellectual
development as measured by IQ tests is about the same as that of a mentally typical
three-year-old child will be said to have a mental age of three
1
years.

9

The notion of mental age has a certain seductive simplicity to it. A
court may be perplexed when it hears testimony that a litigant falls within
the moderately retarded level of disability. But if the testimony describes
that same adult as having a mental age of three years, the court may feel
reassured because all of us have some notion about the abilities and disabilities of three-year-olds. The same court that is uncertain as to whether
a profoundly retarded adult should have known that his actions might
start a fire, may feel more comfortable in deciding whether a three-yearold (or his adult retarded equivalent) should have known. Thus in tort
cases, as well as in other areas of the law, the mental age concept may be
viewed as a useful judicial tool in understanding (and helping juries
understand) how to apply a subjective standard or to otherwise evaluate
the actions of a retarded person.
Although the simplicity of the mental age notion makes it helpful in
understanding the intellectual abilities of a retarded adult, 92 it does not
give the court a full picture of the individual and therefore has the potential to obscure rather than clarify. Mental age describes the individual only in terms of his intellectual skills, which roughly translated means how
well he can do in learning certain academic lessons commonly learned in
childhood. It can be useful in describing the adult's ability to learn
arithmetic or to acquire and use vocabulary. To the extent that these
90. This is true not only in law but in societal attitudes generally. Retarded adults are often

thought of (and treated) as children who never grew up. They are frequently addressed and referred
to as "boys" and "girls," even when they are middle aged and older. See text accompanying note 92

infra.
91. Robinson & Robinson, supra note 64. See also Frank J. Menolascino, ed., Psychiatric Approaches to Mental Retardation 717-19 (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1970).
92. It is also used, of course, with mentally retarded children. Thus a child with a chronological
age of 12 may be said to have a mental age of 3.

1106

AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION RESEARCH JOURNAL

1981:1079

skills or their equivalent are relevant to the defendant's actions in causing
the accident in question, the concept is useful. But to say that a retarded
adult has a mental age of three is not to say that he is in other ways
equivalent to a three-year-old. The adult has lived much longer and has
an adult's body. His experiences will have had a substantial impact on his
knowledge and skills. A three-year-old is unlikely to have lived in society
outside the confines of his family, but the adult may or may not have.
Courts must thus be careful not to let the artificial notion of mental age,
as simple and convenient as it may seem, substitute for a full inquiry into
the actual abilities and experience of the adult whose actions are at issue.
This raises the larger philosophical issue regarding the analogy between
children and retarded adults. The simple fact is that retarded adults are
adults; they are not children. Society has often treated them as children,
and this has proven damaging at least as often as it has been beneficial. 93
The dominant current ideology among professionals who work with retarded people is called normalization,94 and it includes the belief that, as
much as possible, retarded people should be treated like other people of
their chronological age. This notion of age appropriateness is applied to
living arrangements, work situations, recreation, clothing, social relationships, and terminology (retarded adults are not "boys" and "girls").
Whether normalization should lead us to resist treating retarded adults
under the same kind of legal rules ordinarily applied to children but not
to mentally typical adults is a question that the proponents of normalization have not yet addressed.
C. The Utility of Analogies
It appears that analogies between mentally disabled adults on the one
hand and children or physically handicapped adults on the other are helpful tools. But ultimately they cannot resolve the question of the proper
standard of care for mentally disabled tort litigants. No substantial barriers prevent the adoption of the subjective standard already applied to
these other groups. But neither of the analogies is so perfect that it is selfevident that manifest injustice is done when courts refuse to apply a subjective standard to mentally handicapped adults. The question of the responsibility of mentally disabled people for their torts must be considered
on its own merits.

93. See generally Wolf Wolfensberger, The Principle of Normalization in Human Services
(Toronto: National Institute on Mental Retardation, 1972).
94. William G. Bronston, Concepts and Theory of Normalization, in Richard Koch and James
Dobson, eds., The Mentally Retarded Child and His Family: A Multidisciplinary Handbook 490
(rev. ed. New York: Brunner/Mazel, Inc., 1976).
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D. The Rights and Responsibilities of the Mentally Disabled
The observation that rights and responsibilities must exist in balance is
among the most grating of cliches. But as if often the case, it attained its
status as a clich by containing an element of truth. Since the era in
which the current objective standard was adopted, our view of the rights
of mentally disabled people and of their status before the law has
changed dramatically. With the exception of the area of criminal law, we
have given less consideration to the question of what level of responsibility can be expected of our mentally disabled citizens. The reconsideration
of standards of care in negligence cases affords us such an opportunity.
Society has accepted, however unevenly and grudgingly, the principle
that greater numbers of mentally ill and retarded people should be allowed to live in society with a minimum of supervision. We no longer expect (or wish) the majority of the mentally disabled to live in institutions
far removed from the rest of us. These new expectations are grounded in
an acceptance of the full citizenship rights of mentally handicapped people. This will surely result in an increasing number of accidents caused by
such disabled people; all groups cause such accidents, and it would not be
too surprising if mentally disabled people caused somewhat more than
their share. Whether they should bear the costs of these accidents in cases
in which their prevention was beyond the individual's capacity is a question of both equity and compensation. Is it less fair to ask accident victims (or their insurers) to bear the costs of injury when caused by mentally disabled persons than it is in cases involving children or the physically
handicapped? Can we accept as just a rule that holds mentally handicapped people to a standard of care which they are incapable of meeting?
Thoughtful consideration of these questions may suggest the renewed attractiveness of a subjective test.
Courts must also be sure that the rules they adopt are reasonable and
defensible. The rationales for the objective standard have been weakened
by the events of recent decades. If the standard is to be retained, it must
be supported by a more contemporary defense. 9 One element remaining
from the original rationales is the contention that introducing subjective
considerations will burden the courts out of proportion to any anticipated gains in perceived fairness. The burdens are not insubstantial, but
the courts' task under a subjective standard would not differ markedly
from tasks already undertaken in other legal contexts.
95. One attempt at a renewed defense of the objective standard for the mentally ill is found in

Alexander & Szasz, supra note 19. The authors base their defense upon a theory of moral responsibility. Whatever its attractiveness in cases involving the mentally ill, it would probably find less acceptance in cases involving the mentally retarded.
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A more contemporary defense of the objective test might argue that
since normalization calls for retarded adults to be treated like other
adults, they should be held to the same objective standard that applies to
other adults. The problem with this argument is that mentally typical
adults are not held to a standard that they are definitionally incapable of
meeting. The normalization principle can also be invoked to support a
subjective test; mentally typical adults are treated under a standard of
care which is within the abilities of most of them, and retarded adults
should receive no less consideration. Thus, as currently articulated, the
normalization principle appears to offer little guidance in resolving the
larger issue.
Under modern conditions, the subjective standard may be preferable.
It does not immunize mentally disabled people from responsibility for
their torts, but it does provide them with a defense when they can show
that they did their best to avoid the accident and that further preventive
measures were beyond their ability. It could be framed in such a way as
to measure a disabled defendant against the standard of what a reasonable adult of similar experience and intelligence would have been able to
do. Holding the defendant to a higher standard can provide no deterrence to accident-causing behavior; if the defendant is capable of
avoiding the accident he will be held accountable for falling to exercise
that capability. Adoption of this standard would create a class of plaintiffs who cannot obtain recovery from the person who caused the injury,
but it does so in the same manner as is now the case with children and the
physically handicapped. Our fault system, in rejecting strict liability, accepts the plight of such plaintiffs as the regrettable but necessary cost of
doing justice to defendants who performed to the best of their ability.
Should courts choose to adopt such a subjective standard, they would
then face the task of determining the formulation of proper jury instructions concerning the degree of disability and other matters of importance.
None of these tasks is without difficulty, but none is more complex than
those already facing courts in other areas of mental disability law. Mental
disability and the status of mentally disabled people before the law are
complex matters, and no simple solutions will achieve justice for mentally
disabled citizens or for their opponents in litigation.
V. CONCLUSION

The objective standard of care for mentally disabled defendants was an
outgrowth of the ideology of confinement-an ideology that society has
since abandoned. The rule has remained in force because very little litigation involving such defendants has reached the appellate courts and
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because no alternative of stunning superiority has presented itself. Adoption of a subjective standard would not right a vast number of grave injustices, nor would it dramatically ease the burdens of the courts. It
would probably have no effect on the overall number of accidents in
society, nor would it significantly shift the burden of their cost. But on
balance, it may be seen as a modest step toward equitable treatment of
the mentally handicapped before the law.

